

Global Terrorism and Media Reportage of Boko Haram Cases in the 21st Century

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Abstract

Media plays a pivotal role in influencing public opinion, shaping policy responses, and mobilizing local and international support. Arguably, terrorism is not a new phenomenon; it has long been a method of violent action by organizations and individuals attempting to achieve political goals. Indeed, terrorism is not an end but rather a *modus operandi*. Thus, all terrorists share one common denominator: they “live” in the future and are convinced that they will defeat their enemies and achieve their political goals. With this new trend of terrorism in the 21st century, it is imperative to expand the fraction of literature in the area so as to come up with findings that will address the phenomenon. Thus, in order to achieve the objective of the study, secondary data was used as a methodological approach. To locate the study within the context of theoretical framework, Frustration Aggression Theory was considered. Based on the findings, the study discovered that weak democracy, inefficient rule of law, bad governance, the backing of illegitimate regimes, high/rising distributive inequality are among the root causes that led to the emergence of Boko Haram. The study concluded that the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings and the destruction of parts of the Pentagon building on September 11th, forced the international community and especially the American people and US administration to acknowledge the imminent threat of terrorism as well as effects on public insecurity, effects on livelihood and effects on human rights are among the consequences of Boko Haram in the 21st century. The study recommends that forth coming researchers in the area should adopt other methods aside secondary data to expand the fraction of literature in the area. Thus, other methods like survey, in-depth interview among others should be adopted by subsequent researchers so as to bridge the gap in the methodology.

Keywords

21st Century, Boko Haram, Global Terrorism, Media and Reportage



I. Introduction

Media coverage of Boko Haram has focused on its activities, their impact on local communities, government responses, and international efforts to address the group's threats. Reports often emphasize the human toll, the displacement of millions of people, and the broader implications for regional security in West Africa. Coverage, however, faces challenges such as limited access to conflict zones, safety concerns for journalists, and the complexities of reporting on sensitive issues like terrorism and counterterrorism. This has raised concerns about potential gaps, biases, or sensationalism in reportage. The

media's role is crucial in shaping public understanding and policy responses to the crisis. The media reportage of Boko Haram in Nigeria has been a critical aspect of how the crisis is understood locally and globally. Nigerian media outlets, as well as international organizations, have extensively covered Boko Haram's activities since the group gained prominence in the early 2000s.

Terrorism is long before its infamous sobriquet after the "reign of terror" in the aftermath of the French Revolution, it has been around as far back as there is recorded political history. The 1st century historian, Josephus, for instance, talks about Jewish extremist groups, the Sicarii and the Zealots. "Sicarii," literally meaning the "dagger men," would carry small weapon and would plunge it in the bodies of their target, which included the officials of the occupying Roman Empire as well as the Jewish collaborators. After committing murder in broad daylight, the attackers would quickly melt away in the crowded market places (Airaoje et al., 2024). Their brazen acts predictably brought the wrath of the Roman authorities, indiscriminately doling out brutal punishment upon the entire Jewish community in Jerusalem. This is a classic example of terrorist strategy, which Schmid and de-Graaf in Adesoji (2010) describe as, political communication through acts of violence.

This could be the reason why Adesoji (2010) established that terrorists, through their dramatic deeds try to achieve two goals: first, as Count Kropotkin famously called these acts "propaganda by deed," terrorists broadcast their grievances to the world through these acts of attention-grabbing violence. The more spectacular the attack, the bigger is the publicity and the consequent recruitment. Second, as a result of these violent feats of symbolic value, dissident groups draw outsized reaction from the authorities, meted out indiscriminately against the entire community (Aliyu et al., 2023). The groups attempt to recruit the heather-to-fore fence sitters to their cause as the community become further alienated due to the punitive actions by the authorities.

Terrorism, as a weapon of the numerically, politically or economically weak, seldom achieves its goals of a socio-political transformation. Yet, given the symbolic importance of death and destruction, disproportionate fear dominates the minds of the members of the organized society. Being fearful, they demand bold and decisive military action against the miscreants. Therefore, acts of terrorism, in the final analysis, through a volatile mixture of violence with theater create a symbiotic relationship between those with power and those who aspire to grab it from them. Thus, given the proclivities on both sides, terrorism and repression often create their own cycle of cause and effect, feeding on each other (Aondover & Akin-Odukoya, 2024). While in antiquity the importance of violent rebellions was localized, in aglobalized world the significance of political communication through spectacle of violence poses one of the greatest challenges to the twenty-first century policymakers from all over the world (Adetoro, 2012).

Therefore, terrorism is not a new phenomenon; it has long been a method of violent action by organizations and individuals attempting to achieve political goals. Indeed, terrorism is not an end but rather a *modus operandi*. According to Bruce in Aondover et al., (2022) all terrorists share one common denominator: they "live" in the future and are convinced that they will defeat their enemies and achieve their political goals. There are perhaps hundreds of different definitions of terrorism, all of which tend to reflect the political world-view of the definer (Aondover et al., 2024). The same act of violence can be classified differently, depending on the identities of the perpetrators. Groups that engage in identical behavior might be considered by their sympathizers as freedom fighters and by

their enemies as terrorists. In this perspective, the working assumption is that terrorism is a modus operandi in which deliberate violence against civilians is used for the purpose of achieving political goals. Thus, it is the intentional harming of civilians, which is at the core of terrorism, that makes this modus operandi illegitimate, even if it is meant, *prima facie*, to achieve justified objectives. This definition makes a distinction between an action intended to harm civilians and one intended to harm military and security personnel (Aondover et al., 2022).

Scholars like Danjibo (2009) articulated in the literature that the first major attempt of Boko Haram was in the post-colonial period that was led by the leader of the Maitatsine sectarian group in 1980s and eventually led to large scale uprisings. Thus, it can therefore be said that the emergence of this global dreaded Islamic sect popularly known as the Boko Haram had its root and inspiration from the “Maitatsine” uprisings of the early 1980s in particular. Boko Haram could be compared in terms of philosophy or ideology and objectives to the Maitatsine sectarian group, its organizational planning, armed resistance and modus operandi as captured by (Aondover et al., 2024). During the colonial era, a revolutionary Mahdism which received little elite support but attracted “radical clerics” disgruntled peasants and fugitive slaves sought unsuccessfully to overthrow the British colonial regime which controlled the Sokoto Caliphate founded after the jihad of Usman Dan Fodio.

Therefore, a number of studies have been conducted on the global terrorism in the 21st century. However, so many data collected, articulated that terrorist activities of the Boko Haram have negative impact on Nigeria which hinders her from focusing attention on national development rather than shift to combating terrorism (Boko Haram) which cost the country millions of dollars. Whereas if such amount of money is invested into education, then, the country would have been on her way to the promise land. Adagha and Eme (2012) affirmed this by saying that the destruction posed by the Boko Haram activities are on a rampage, which happens in public places and has affected almost all parts of the country. For instance, the attack by the terrorists’ group in Maiduguri, Abuja, Gombe, Kano, Potiskum and Damaturu in Yobe and Madalla in Niger state, etc, is an indication that lives and property were not fully protected. Thus, there is a lacuna in the literature revealed that needs methodological and theoretical approach. Scholars like Adagba et al., in Aondover (2018) have established that there is paucity of literature on the area which necessitated this study to examine global terrorism in the 21st century using Boko Haram as a test case. Within this context, this paper examined global terrorism, ascertain the root cause that led to the emergence of Boko Haram and the paper analysed the Nigeria state response to terrorism in Nigeria (Aondover et al., 2024).

II. Review of Literature

2.1 Terrorism at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century

Instead, on September 11, 2001, the world awakened to a new danger global jihadi terrorism of unanticipated magnitude. The attacks represented a transformation in international terrorism, both on the scale and the motive: these attacks were motivated by religious grievances. The message conveyed to the public through the attacks was that no place is safe. No state is immune, not even a superpower like the United States. The September 11 attacks represented a new reality in international terrorism. The world community, in the wake of these attacks, found itself seemingly in unprecedented peril. The face of international terrorism had changed. But the phenomenon of global jihadi terrorism has roots and ramifications that reach back several years (Aondover et al., 2022).

Before 9/11, it was convenient for many states and world leaders to turn a blind eye to the unfolding threat, as long as they were not its direct victims or its central focus. Indeed, the radical Islamic movement originally focused not on attacking western targets, but on conquering the hearts and minds of Muslim communities all over the world through educational, religious, and welfare activities, known as “dawah” activities. These activities were based on the dogmatic radical perspectives of the movement, which praised the use of violence in “defense of Islam.” Still, in most cases, the principle remained theoretical and the call to violence never manifested itself as a concrete act of violent terrorist activity. This made it possible and even convenient for world leaders to underestimate the threat. The death of nearly 3,000 civilians, the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings and the destruction of parts of the Pentagon building on September 11th, forced the international community, especially the American people and US administration to acknowledge the imminent threat of terrorism. Since then, members of the global jihadi network have not hesitated to utilize a method of modern terrorism that has proved more effective than any other like suicide attacks (Garba & Msughter, 2023).

Within the local context, in 2002, an offshoot of this youth group (not yet known as Boko Haram) declared the city and the Islamic establishment to be intolerably corrupt and irredeemable. The group declared it was embarking on hijra (a withdrawal along the lines of the Prophet Muhammad’s withdrawal from Mecca to Medina). It moved from Maiduguri to a village called Kanama in Yobe State, near the border with Niger, to set up a separatist community run on hardline Islamic principles. Its leader, Mohammed Ali, espoused anti-state ideology and called on other Muslims to join the group and return to a life under “true” Islamic law, with the aim of making a more perfect society away from the corrupt establishment. In December 2003, following a community dispute regarding fishing rights in a local pond, the group got into a conflict with the police. Group members overpowered a squad of officers and took their weapons. This confrontation led to a siege of its mosque by the army that lasted into the New Year. The siege ended in a shootout in which most of the group’s seventy members were killed, including Mohammed Ali (Garba & Msughter, 2023).

The group had gained press attention in Nigeria and interest from the U.S. Embassy, because of the catchy name locals had given it the Nigerian Taliban. It also caught the attention of the Nigerian media because many of the group’s members were the sons of wealthy and influential people in Nigeria’s Northern establishment. They were perhaps not all from the very highest circle of Nigerian society but one was alleged to have been the son of then Yobe Governor Bukar Abba Ibrahim. In 2004, U.S. State Department cable, revealed by wiki leaks, the U.S. embassy in Abuja concluded that the group did not present an international threat and likely had no links to international jihadist organizations. The few survivors of the “Nigerian Taliban” returned to Maiduguri, where they settled back with others from the youth group that had originated at the Ndume Mosque. The leader of this Maiduguri group, Mohammed Yusuf, then embarked on the process of establishing the group’s own Mosque in Maiduguri. This new Mosque, named the Ibn Taimiyyah Masjid was built on land to the north of the center of town, near the railway station, owned by Yusuf’s father-in-law, Baba Fugu Mohammed. The group was apparently left alone by the authorities and it expanded into other states, including Bauchi, Yobe and Niger state (Mu’azu, 2011).

The group’s neighbors in Maiduguri dubbed the group Boko Haram, which roughly translates as “Western education is forbidden” in Hausa. Observers say the group constructed a “state within a state,” with a cabinet, its own religious police and a large farm. It attracted more and more people under its roof by offering welfare handouts, food

and shelter (Hile et al., 2023). Many of the people the group attracted were refugees from the wars over the border in Chad and jobless Nigerian youths. The source of the group's money at this stage of its existence is not clear. Members of the Borno religious establishment say that Yusuf received funds from Salafist contacts in Saudi Arabia following two hajj trips that Yusuf made during this time. Another possible source of funding during this period was donations from wealthy Northern Nigerians. In 2006, a wealthy Northern businessman was arrested by the State Security Services after a group of children alleged that they had been sent by the group to an al-Qaeda training camp in Mauritania. Children with emotional and behavioural difficulties are faced with interpersonal relationships, and their maladjusted behaviours are only a way of coping with difficult situations (Gadour, 2009). The businessman says his donations to the group were an innocent attempt to contribute zakat, an obligation of wealthy Muslims to give charitably (The Nigerian Tribune Newspaper, 2014).

On the eve of the 2007 presidential elections, Sheikh Ja'afar Mahmoud Adam, a prominent, popular cleric and regular preacher at the Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, was assassinated as he was praying at the Mosque. The killing was a mystery for some time, but it is now acknowledged that it was carried out on the orders of Mohammed Yusuf. Sheikh Ja'afar had begun to criticize the group for its hardline ideology, predicting a clash with the state (Maikaba & Msughter, 2019). The killing is now seen by some as a key point in the development of Boko Haram, because there was no longer the possibility of turning Yusuf and his followers back to the mainstream of the Northern Islamic establishment. Much bloodier events soon followed. In July 2009 the group came into conflict with the authorities in a strikingly similar way to the events of six years before. Traveling en masse to the funeral of a fellow member, the group was stopped by police traffic officers, who were enforcing a tightened restriction on motorcycle helmets and an argument ensued. The circumstances are unclear but a member of the group is reported to have fired on the police, injuring several officers (The Nigerian Tribune Newspaper, 2014).

The group then attacked police stations in Bauchi and Yobe, killing scores of police officers. Yusuf released several video sermons in which he explicitly threatened the state and the police with violence. They were circulated on DVD and gained a widespread audience. These events led the Bauchi government to crack down on the group, arresting more than seven hundred members. In Maiduguri, the police surrounded the group's Mosque but members of the sect managed to break out and for three days they had the run of the town. They roamed the city acting independently, fighting police when they came across them and killing Muslim and Christian civilians indiscriminately. The police eventually regained control of Maiduguri and then embarked on a bloody purge of the group's members and anyone they suspected of being a Boko Haram supporter or sympathizer. Dozens of people were rounded up and executed without trial, including Yusuf's father-in-law. Mohammed Yusuf was arrested by the army and handed over to the police, who killed him within hours. Police officials denied that he had been executed, saying he had been shot while trying to escape. Videos clearly showing the execution of young boys and other alleged Boko Haram members by the police, including Buji Foi, a former commissioner for religious affairs in the state, have been posted on YouTube (Mojaye & Aondover, 2022).

Sometime in mid-2010 Boko Haram returned to Maiduguri and started a campaign of assassinations. This campaign began with hit-and-run attacks against police checkpoints in Borno and Yobe. The group's favored method was to do so, on motorcycle, whereby the pillion rider would kill the police officers and seize their weapons. Gunmen also forced their way into the homes of local leaders who had cooperated with the police by naming

Boko Haram members. The people who had taken over houses formerly belonging to escaped Boko Haram members were also killed if they refused to leave. On Christmas eve 2010 as many as half a dozen bombs were detonated near Churches and a market in two districts of Jos, Plateau State, killing scores of people. At the time it was not assumed to be a Boko Haram attack; it was thought to be a nasty twist to the long-standing ethno-political conflict there. Then, on New Year's Eve 2010 a bomb was detonated in a popular open-air fish restaurant and market inside the grounds of the Mogadishu barracks, just outside Abuja, killing ten. While it sits very close to a military barracks, the market was frequented mostly by civilians and was relatively loosely protected (The Nigerian Tribune Newspaper, 2014).

During the first few months of 2011, the group's targets for assassination operations in Maiduguri widened beyond the original focus of police and other authorities.

In February 2011, for example, a pharmacist in Maiduguri-not believed to have had any previous connection to the group's treatment by the police was murdered in a robbery neighbors attributed to Boko Haram (Abba et al., 2021). Cash and a large amount of medical supplies were taken from his shop. The group began to rob banks, cash-in-transit convoys and successful businesses, not only in Maiduguri but also in Bauchi, where the group remains strong. The group claims it is permitted to do this by the Quran, as the money it takes is considered to be the "spoils of war." A source who has followed the group closely states that the group is thought to have made approximately 500 million naira (about \$3 million, or £2 million) from such robberies, but such claims are unverifiable. In June 2011 Boko Haram bombed the national police headquarters in Abuja. A car laden with explosives drove into the compound of Louis Edet House, a block of offices previously thought secure in Abuja's government zone, by following a convoy of senior officers through the gates. It is believed the driver aimed to put the car near the entrance stairway as the senior officers entered, but he was directed around the back of the building by guards, where the bomb detonated in the car park (Msughter, 2017).

In January 2012, three groups of gunmen and suicide bombers coordinated attacks on three government buildings in Kano the police headquarters, the office of the immigration service and the State Security Service. More than two hundred people were killed. The group has also continued its involvement in the long-standing conflict between indigenous groups and Hausa/Fulani "settlers" in Plateau state. Most of the violence in the area has not had a connection to Boko Haram but in February 2012 a suicide car bomb was detonated at a Jos Church. Days later, in March, another suicide bomb was detonated outside St. Finbar's Church in Rayfield, Jos, near the government house (Msughter et al., 2023). Nineteen people have been killed so far in retaliatory tit-for-tat attacks immediately following those bombings. More recently, there have been deadly bomb and gun attacks on the offices of Thisday newspaper in Abuja and Kaduna, the Catholic chapel in Bayero University Kano and a cattle market in Yobe, dozens were killed in each attack (Obasi & Aondover, 2023).

2.2 Theoretical Framework

This paper espoused on Frustration Aggression Theory. The theory was propounded by Dollard (1939) and since then it has been modified by scholars like Leonard (1963) and Aubrey (1962). The theory appears to be the most common explanation for violent behavior stemming from inability to fulfill needs, such can be seeing in the scenario of the Niger Delta Avengers and the Boko Haram insurgency respectively.

The theory assume that aggression is not just undertaken as a natural reaction or instinctive act as realist and biological theorists assume but it is the outcome of frustration (Yar'Adua & Msughter, 2023). In a situation where the legitimate desires of an individual is denied either directly or by the indirect consequence of the way the society is structured, the feeling of disappointment may lead a person to express his anger through violence that will be directed at those he hold responsible or people who are directly or indirectly related to them. To Dollard (1939), people are motivated to act aggressively by a drive induced by frustration. "The concept of frustration denotes condition that arises when goal attainment is blocked, while aggression constitutes actions aimed at harming perceived stumbling blocks" (Onyejelem & Aondover, 2024a).

It is implied that frustration will inevitably lead to some form of aggression. When the aggrieved do not have easy access to the stumbling block, they take out their violent response on "symbolic representation of the imagined enemy and expressed in an indirect way" (Hewstone and Stroebe, cited in Jegede and Ajayi, 2008, p. 147). In this case, the stumbling block is the government which has failed to provide the means of self-actualization for majority of the population (over 70%) that is regarded as poor; living on less than 2 dollar per day and with no access to basic social infrastructure. The symbolic representation includes, innocent unprotected civilians, expatriates, government officials (including police and military officials) public property; perceived as agents of the state (Onyejelem & Aondover, 2024b).

Jegede and Ajayi (2008) established that most of the country's past leaders, military and civilian have been from the north and they failed to utilize the national resources in developing the region, as they preferred to engage in wanton looting of public funds. The northern leaders possess enormous personal wealth, leaving the young people with no hope and no future, as critical infrastructure are non-existent, public schools are underfunded and abandoned. The youth are frustrated as they see the past and present political leaders live in affluence, while they are jobless, uneducated and poverty stricken with no hope (Oreoluwa et al., 2024). They become easy prey to be mobilized by the terrorist group, who claim to be fighting injustice meted to them by corrupt leaders, who have been corrupted from the true tenets of Islam by their exposure to western education. They take out their frustration on government institutions and those who do not join in their fight against the "evil" system. This frustration of the youth is what gave birth to all kind of vices in the country; hence the government has failed the people in all ramifications (Owens-Ibie & Aondover, 2024).

III. Results and Discussion

3.1 Research Procedure

Secondary data was employed to present and analyse the data gathered which emerged in the course of reviewing the existing literature. These relevant literatures are used to address the research questions earlier postulated for this research work.

a. RQ1: What is global terrorism in the 21st century?

From the empirical evidence, on September 11, 2001, the world awakened to a new danger global jihadi terrorism of unanticipated magnitude. The attacks represented a transformation in international terrorism, both on the scale and the motive: these attacks were motivated by religious grievances. The message conveyed to the public through the attacks was that no place is safe. No state is immune not even a superpower like the United States. The September 11 attacks represented a new reality in international terrorism. The

world community, in the wake of these attacks, found itself seemingly in unprecedented peril. The face of international terrorism had changed. But the phenomenon of global jihadi terrorism has roots and ramifications that reach back several years. Before 9/11, it was convenient for many states and world leaders to turn a blind eye to the unfolding threat, as long as they were not its direct victims or its central focus.

Indeed, the radical Islamic movement originally focused not on attacking western targets, but on conquering the hearts and minds of Muslim communities all over the world through educational, religious and welfare activities, known as “dawah” activities. These activities were based on the dogmatic radical perspectives of the movement, which praised the use of violence in “defense of Islam.” Still, in most cases, the principle remained theoretical and the call to violence never manifested itself as a concrete act of violent terrorist activity. This made it possible and even convenient for world leaders to underestimate the threat. The death of nearly 3,000 civilians, the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings and the destruction of parts of the Pentagon building on September 11th, forced the international community and especially the American people and US administration to acknowledge the imminent threat of terrorism. Since then, members of the global jihadi network have not hesitated to utilize a method of modern terrorism that has proved more effective than any other, namely, suicide attacks.

b. RQ2: What is the root cause that led to the emergence of Boko Haram?

Based on the empirical evidence, the root causes of terrorism, just like its definition are contested in the available research literature. Since there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism, it is difficult to agree on what constitutes the underlying causes of terrorism at the local and international levels (Newman, 2006). However, a quick scan of the major research literature on terrorism reveals common themes identified by scholars as the primary root causes of terrorism. These include the following:

Permissive structural factors and direct grievances: Newman (2006) identified the above mentioned as one of the root causes of terrorism. According to him the structural factors represent the structures that enable, ferment and perpetuate all forms of injustices. They are the enablers of terrorism at the pre-manifest conflict processes level. These structures could be local, national or international institutions that ferment poverty, unfavorable social change, unemployment or forced migration and so on. The underlying grievances are tangible political issues that have not yet been resolved, including “inequality, exclusion, repression, dispossession, sense of humiliation/alienation, sense of foreign occupation/hegemony, clash of identities/dispute with identity aspect, violent conflict, negative effects of globalization, sudden economic downturns” (Newman, 2006).

Preconditions and precipitants cause of terrorism: in 1981, Martha Crenshaw published important research in which she identified two distinguishing categories of causes. The preconditions and the precipitant causes of terrorism, the preconditions are those underlying factors that create the conditions for the emergence of terrorism and they are a combination of root causes and situational or proximate causes. Examples of the root causes that Sirseloudi (2004 p. 133) outlined in his research are “weak democracy, inefficient rule of law, bad governance, the backing of illegitimate regimes, high/rising distributive inequality, historical experience of violent conflict waging, support for groups using terrorist means, vulnerability of modern democracies and failed states/safe havens outside state control”.

Accommodating nature of the environment they are located: One dimension one must put into consideration is that terrorism does not take place in isolation of the society. Terrorists are humans who live among people within the international system, particularly

in states. One of the reason terrorists have gained prominence is because of the accommodating nature of the environment in which they find themselves in, for instance the Boko Haram terrorist group has found a safe haven in Borno state and resident in the Sambisa Forest in which they use as their base in planning terrorist attacks. But when government mounts surveillance on citizen's activities there are fewer tendencies that individuals will form formidable terrorist cells to carry out their nefarious acts.

Ideological contestation and counter power: mostly at the international stage this could propel terrorist acts. Terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Boko Haram want to introduce their ideology and show their power pre-eminently through carrying out violent attacks and destroy lives just to embarrass their more powerful opponents, for instance the September 11, 2001 bombing in US is a point of reference.

Religious reason: is another cause of terrorist acts, it is believed by some religious fanatics that fighting to protect a particular set of religion is the best way of representing God and propagating their religion. For example, in November 2001, an audio tape purportedly from Osama Bin Laden was broadcasted by Al Jazeera. The speaker paid tribute to those who had carried out a series of attacks in Indonesia, Russia, Kuwait, Jordan and Yemen, nothing that attacks were "undertaken by the zealous sons of Islam in defense of their religion and in response to the call of their God and prophet. This religious fanatic or 'extremists' have supported the act of terrorism via its establishment and sponsorship. They are both at the national and international level. Thus, the above mention factors could be adduced as being responsible for the emergence and spread of Boko Haram sect in Nigeria.

c. RQ3: What are the consequences of Boko Haram?

Going by the road to literature, Nigeria has never experienced such a complex emergency as devastating as the Boko Haram insurgency in its move to democracy. As such, research question three attempts to highlight the consequences of Boko Haram. Schmid (2005) established the consequences thus:

Effects on Public Insecurity: Life in Nigeria has never been the same since the infiltration of the Nigerian territory by the Islamist sect Boko Haram in 2009 especially in the north-Eastern part of the country. Since the outbreak of the sectarian violence, inhabitants of the Far north region of Nigeria have ceased to know peace and inhabitants live in constant fear and agony. Suicide bombings, killings, destruction of life and property have been the order of the day. There is been total insecurity in the country. Since the inception of the sect in 2009, the country has not known civil normality with sporadic suicide and car bombings which have become part and parcel of their daily lives.

Effects on Livelihood: The aftermath of the Islamist sect Boko Haram terrorist's activities in the country has left a disastrous effect on livelihood. All works of life especially in the northern region of the country has been affected negatively; due to the insecurity food production has dropped drastically. Farmers no longer go to farms for the fear of been killed and most of the farms have turned into battle grounds. Commercial activities have also dropped drastically, northeastern Nigeria which is the supply route for the northern region of Cameroon has been blocked due to Boko Haram insurgency. One of the inhabitants and a trader in Fotokol, in Cameroon revealed that the local economy of Fotokol depend solely on the cross-border trade with Nigeria. They sell commodities like onion, maize, livestock, rice and other agricultural goods to Nigeria and in exchange, they import sugar, textile, electronics and cement from Nigeria.

Effects on Human Rights: According to the Human Rights Watch (2012) Boko Haram insurgency has led to violation of human rights and commission of war crimes by

both the insurgents and the government forces. The military and police, for instance, have committed human rights abuses and extra-judicial killings. According to report by Amnesty International on Nigerian Human Right Abuse (2015/2016) both Boko Haram and the Nigeria security have been committing gross human right abuses. Boko Haram committed crimes under international law and human rights abuses, including suicide bomb attacks in civilian areas, summary executions, torture, hostage taking, abductions and the recruitment of child soldiers, looting and destruction of public, private and religious property. These crimes appear to be part of a regular attack against the civilian population across the country.

Effects on Population Displacement and Refugee Debacle: Boko Haram insurgency has led to the displacement of huge human population and there have been a refugee disaster in the north eastern part of the country. Available information suggests that the number of internally displaced persons and refugees associated with the insurgency has been enormous. According to a recent United Nations Humanitarian Commission on Refugee (UNHCR) report, 65,000 Nigerian refugees are in the north of Cameroon and thousands of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as a result of the rampant insurgency by Boko Haram militants. The Minawao refugee camp has been over crowded with over 56,783 refugees.

Effects on Human Casualties/Fatalities: by far, the worst humanitarian consequences of the Boko Haram insurgency have been its tolls on human life and safety. Thousands of lives have been lost in Nigeria since the advent of incursions of the Islamist sect Boko Haram. According to a report by Amnesty International, from July 2009 to July 2015 about 200 attacks have been carried out by Boko Haram including about 40 cases of suicide bombings in the country. These attacks have killed more than 5000 persons. The presence of Boko Haram which has caused forced displacement, human fatalities, famine and epidemics has exacerbated the already existing socio economic and political crisis in the country.

3.2 Discussion of Findings

The findings of this study are similar with what other scholars have established in the literature. Hafez (2004) in his study argued that the use of violence especially indiscriminate killing by non-state actors is likely to occur when political structure seems repressive. State actors' repressions against non-state actors create environment of brutality which forces latter create exclusive organizations to shield themselves from the repressions. Boko Haram members especially in 2009 faced great repression including extrajudicial killings of their members. That created a sense of injustice, a call to arms and forced them into clandestine organization as the repression increased. Hafez further explained that, when such things happen, the non-state while underground create anti-system frames to motivate collective action. He however, maintained that where regimes are frame as corrupt these clandestine movements become further radicalized through a growing belief of total war.

Again et al., in Walker (2012) established that, the eruption of ethnic and religious movements in Nigeria suggests that minority groups facing oppression tend to react as long as there is a political opportunity at hand and the group has the motivation to act. This could be the reason why Walker (2012) established that Boko Haram was created under the Nigeria's conditions of long history of ethno-religious tension, which accounts for the possible rise of religiously and ethnically motivated movements. There is also growing religious and ethnic groups all over the country as well as "weakness in the institutions of politics and the security services" that creates a political opportunity for those threats to

thrive. However, despite the fact that collective actions may take advantage of any opportunity to blossom, Nigeria's religious movements had been more or less non-violent.

To sum it up, Adesoji (2010) articulates that the recent reports in the Nigerian and foreign press about the activities of such groups as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (SGPC) in Algeria, Tablighi clerics from Pakistan and Wahabist missionaries from Saudi Arabia in Northern Nigeria, as well as the report of the training of some fundamentalists in Al-Qaeda camps in some foreign countries, offer proof of Boko Haram's links with fundamentalist groups around the world are to certain extent true. It is clear from the available findings that the sect is against anything that has to do with western values in the country in general and northern part in particular. Therefore, the findings of the study coincided with the assumption of Frustration Aggression Theory as the frustration of the youth is what gave birth to all kind of vices in the country which Boko Haram is one of such vices.

IV. Conclusion

Boko Haram also negatively impacts Nigerian social development. Between 2009 and 2018 alone, attacks on religious figures and institutions comprised an estimated ten percent of Boko Haram's targets thereby magnifying existing religious tensions in Nigeria. The alarming increase in attacks on schools severely impacts Nigerian social development as well. School attacks are especially detrimental to social development because thousands of children are deterred from receiving an education. Nigeria currently suffers from low school attendance and high levels of illiteracy, most prevalent among the female population. The study concluded that the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings and the destruction of parts of the Pentagon building on September 11th, forced the international community and especially the American people and US administration to acknowledge the imminent threat of terrorism as well as effects on public insecurity, effects on livelihood and effects on human rights are among the consequences of Boko Haram in the 21st century.

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